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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Americans with
Disabilities Act.' The Act was heralded as "perhaps the most significant extension
of federal civil rights protections since the 1960s," providing Americans with
disabilities protections similar to those provided to individuals subjected to race,
2sex, or religious discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)guarantees equal opportunity in employment,3 equal access to services and benefits
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
2. Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27 U.S.F.
L. REV. 149-50 (1992).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
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provided by state and local governments, 4 and equal access to accommodations,
goods, and services provided by private commercial entities The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice, and the
Department of Transportation have promulgated regulations to ensure compliance
with the ADA's various subchapters.'
Since the 1992 implementation of the ADA's provisions regarding
employment, one of the major areas of confusion and controversy has been defining
the class of individuals who are protected by the statute. A recent Supreme Court
decision, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,8 partially resolved this issue by clarifying
the definition of "disability." 9 This Casenote focuses on the Sutton decision and its
future impact on ADA employment litigation. Part II reviews the historical
background of the ADA," while Part IR outlines the employment provisions of the
Act." Part IV considers the significance of mitigating measures in the definition of
disability, 2 and Part V examines the text of the Sutton decision. 3 Finally, Part VI
analyzes the future impact of the decision on the class of individuals with
disabilities and on the authority of the EEOC's regulations and guidelines.
14
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ADA
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, the primary federal law addressing
discrimination against the disabled was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.s As the first
federal legislation protecting individuals with disabilities, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 was a large step toward eliminating discrimination against this group. 6 The
coverage of the Act, however, was significantly limited. The Act only prohibited
discrimination by federal executive agencies, federal grantees, and federal
4. Id. §§ 12131-12134, 12141-12165.
5. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
6. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1999) (providing the text of the EEOC's regulations regarding employment
compliance with the provisions of the ADA); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35-36 (1999) (stating the regulations of the Department
of Justice for state and local government non-transportation compliance with the ADA's provisions, and for
compliance by private businesses providing goods and services); 49 C.F.R. § 37 (1999) (asserting the regulations
of the Department of Transportation for compliance of transportation providers with the ADA's provisions).
7. See infra Part IV.A-B (describing the differing court decisions regarding whether individuals whose
disabilities had been mitigated were included in the class of individuals protected by the ADA).
8. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
9. Id. at 482.
10. InfraPartln.
11. Infra Part lEI.
12. Infra Part IV.
13. Infra Part V.
14. Infra Part VI.
15. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
16. Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some Initial Thoughts as
to Its Constitutional Implications, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 185, 188 (1992).
1131
2000/Narrowing the Class of Individuals with Disabilities
contractors.' 7 Thus, despite the 1973 Act, a vast number of employers could freely
discriminate on the basis of a disability without violating federal law.
Numerous measures followed the 1973 Act, including the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act,'8 the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act,19 and the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act.20
Like the 1973 Act, these Acts also provided limited coverage, regulating only the
conduct of the federal government or federally funded activities.2 As a result, many
programs and activities remained free from sanction for discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.
The nation, however, was growing increasingly aware of the plight of the
disabled. In 1983, the United States Commission on Civil Rights produced a
Congressional report revealing that discrimination against individuals with
disabilities was a serious and pervasive national problem, and that such
discrimination existed in education, employment, institutionalization, medical
treatment, architectural barriers, and transportation.22
In 1986, Louis Harris and Associates conducted a nationwide poll of people
with disabilities and found that this class of American citizens was less wealthy,
less educated, more socially isolated, and more dissatisfied with themselves than
other American citizens.2 Significantly, the survey results indicated that
unemployment, as a result ofjob discrimination, was the major source of frustration
for individuals with disabilities.2
Also in 1986, the National Council on the Handicapped published an
assessment of federal laws and programs affecting persons with disabilities.' The
Council found that of 12.9 million working-age persons reporting a work disability,
only 4.2 million, or thirty-two percent, were actually working at the time of the
17. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999).
18. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (now known as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act), Pub. L. No. 94-142,89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1487).
19. Developmental Disabilities Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-527, 98 Stat. 2662 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6083).
20. Voting Accessibility Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §1973ee).
21. Robert L Burgdorf Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second.
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,428-29 (1991).
22. Id. at 416-17 (quoting UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE
SPECTRUM OFINDIVIDUALABLITES 159, 165-68 (1983)).
23. IL at 415-16 (citing LOuiS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS:
BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS NTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986)).
24. Id. (citing Lous HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING
DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986)).
25. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED [NOW NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY], TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTNG PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES-
WITHLEGISLATIVEREOMMENDATONS (1986) (visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http//www.ncd.gov> (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
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1980 census.26 The Council attributed the high unemployment rate, in part, to
employer attitudes that stereotyped persons with disabilities are unable to produce
and compete like other workers.27
After conducting sixty-three public meetings in all fifty states, attended by
more than 32,000 people, the Congressional Task Force on the Rights and
Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities made their formal finding in 1990.
The Task Force found that massive, society-wide discrimination against people with
disabilities existed.2 The Task Force noted that although great strides had been
made in the past few decades, society was still infected by the almost subconscious
assumption that people with disabilities are "less than fully human" and thus not
worthy of the opportunities and services available to the non-disabled.29
All of the organizations, groups, and reports described above contributed to
Congress' growing realization of the need for comprehensive legislation to deal
with discrimination against people with disabilities. The information provided the
impetus for the enactment of the ADA, which was signed into law on July 26,
1990.30 The EEOC was charged with developing regulations for Title I, the
employment section of the ADA, which encompassed sections 12111 through
12117.31 These regulations were enacted on July 26,1991, providing definitions and
explanations of various terms, including definitions of the statutory terms defining
disability.32 In addition, the EEOC published an appendix to its regulations entitled
"Interpretative Guidance."
33
III. TrrTLE I OF THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT
Title I of the ADA seeks to eliminate employment discrimination by a broad
array of individuals and entities, including employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and joint labor-management committees. 34 All employers fall within
the jurisdiction of Title I if they have fifteen or more employees for each working
day in twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 5 However,




28. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 31-32 (1990) (providing the testimony of Justin Dart, chairperson
of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, regarding the findings of the
Task Force).
29. Id.
30. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116 (West 1995).
32. 56 Fed. Reg. 35734 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1999)).
33. 56 Fed. Reg. 35726 & 35734 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (1999)).
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
35. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
36. Id. § 12111(5)(B).
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Title I establishes the general rule that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. ' 37 To guide the application of this
general prohibition of discrimination, Title I provides several rules of construction
explaining that the following are forms of discrimination: (1) "limiting, segregating
or classifying," because of a disability, an applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of the employee; (2) participating in
contracts "or other arrangements or relationships," including employment agencies,
labor unions, pension or fringe benefit plan organizations, or training organizations,
that have the effect of subjecting an applicant or employee to discrimination; (3)
using standards of performance that have a discriminatory effect on individuals
with disabilities, unless such standards are directly related to the essential functions
of thejob; (4) excluding or disadvantaging an employee or applicant because of that
individual's relationship or association with another individual known to have a
disability; (5) "not making reasonable accommodations for known physical or
mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability," or denying
employment opportunities to an individual because of the need for reasonable
accommodation; and (6) using qualifications, employment tests, or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out individuals because of their disabilities
unless the qualifications, tests or criteria are job-related and consistent with
business necessity.38 Employment testing procedures that demonstrate only a
person's impairments, rather than accurately reflecting skills, aptitudes, or other
facts relevant to employment, are prohibited.39 Likewise, making inquiries
concerning ajob applicant's disability, unless such pre-employment inquiries relate
to the ability of the applicant to perform specific job-related functions, are
prohibited.40 In addition, Title I only allows job-related medical exams after an offer
of employment.4'
A. Claim Requirements Under Title I
To establish a claim under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must first demonstrate
that she is disabled within the definition of the term under the Act.42 All titles of the
37. Id. § 12112(a).
38. Id. § 12112(b)(i)-(6).
39. Id. § 12112(b)(7).
40. Id. § 12112(c)(2).
41. Id.
42. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that an airline
mechanic diagnosed with Parsonage-Turner syndrome, a rare neurological disorder, demonstrated that he was a
qualified individual with a disability as defined in the Act because he met the prerequisites for the job and could
perform the job with reasonable accommodation).
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Act operate under the same definition of disability.43 This definition has three
separate prongs. First, a person is disabled if she has "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits major life activity."" Second, a person is
disabled if she has "a record of such an impairment."' Third, a person is disabled
if she is "regarded as having such an impairment."46
After establishing that she is disabled under the Act, a plaintiff must then show
that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or
without reasonable accommodation.47 If reasonable accommodation is necessary,
the plaintiff is only required to show that reasonable accommodation is possible.48
At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that such accommodation
constitutes an undue hardship.49
Finally, the plaintiff must show that she has suffered adverse employment
action as a result of the disability.50 Thus, a claim under Title I requires proof of
three elements: (1) that the plaintiff is disabled under any of the three definitions;
51
(2) that the plaintiff can perform the essential functions of the job;52 and (3) that the
plaintiff was discriminated against in some way because of the disability.53
B. The First Prong of the Definition of Disability
The first prong of the definition of "disability" is perhaps the most
straightforward and easily understood. The language of the statute is as follows:
"[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual[, ] a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual. '54 Thus, this prong of the definition encompasses the terms "physical
or mental impairment," "substantially limits," and "major life activity.""s
43. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (West 1995) (defining the term "disability").
44. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
45. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
46. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
47. Benson, 62E3d 1108, 1111-12.
48. See Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Postal Service must prove
its inability to accommodate, without undue hardship, a distribution clerk who could not bend, crouch or stoop
and who presented evidence of measures the Postal Service could take to accommodate him).
49. Id.
50. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (West 1995) (describing various forms of prohibited adverse action, including
adversely affecting the employee's opportunities for advancement, denying equal pay or benefits, refusal to hire,
refusal to provide training, and discharge).
51. See infra Part m.B-D (providing the definitions of disability).
52. See infra Part Il.E (explaining the elements necessary to prove one can perform the essential functions
of the job).
53. Supra note 50.
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1995).
55. Id.
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1. The Definition of "Physical or Mental Impairment"
A physical impairment includes any physiological conditions, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more major body systems, such
as the neurological, musculoskeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, heoic, or lymphatic system.56 A mental impairment
includes "any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.""7
The ADA and accompanying regulations expressly exclude several conditions
or attributes from the definition of "disability." These include: homosexuality or
bisexuality;58 various types of sexual behavior such as transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism; gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments or other sexual behavior disorders;59 compulsive gambling,
kleptomania, or pyromania;60 substance abuse disorders resulting from the current
use of illegal drugs;6' and normal pregnancy.62 Circumstances such as advanced
age, cultural or economic disadvantage, lack of education, and a prison record are
also excluded as qualifying disabilities under the Act.63
2. The Definition of "Substantially Limiting"
An impairment is "substantially limiting" if it renders an individual "unable to
perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform." An impairment that significantly restricts "the condition, manner, or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared" to an average person in the general population is also "substantially
limiting" under the Act.6 The factors considered in determining whether a person
is substantially limited in a major life activity are: (1) the nature and severity of the
impairment; (2) its duration or anticipated duration; and (3) its long-term impact.65
The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made on a case-by-case basis.(
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1999).
57. ld. § 1630.2(h)(2).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(a) (West 1995).
59. Id. § 12211(b)(1).
60. Id. § 12211(b)(2).
61. Id. § 12211(b)(3).
62. 29 C.RR. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
63. Id.
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (1999).
65. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
66. See, e.g., Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048
(1998) (quoting Harris v. H&W Contracting, 102 F.3d 516,520-21 (1 th Cir. 1996), and asserting that the court
must analyze on an individual basis whether a police officer who is blind in one eye is substantially limited in the
major life ectivity of seeing, because individuals can compensate for this loss of sight).
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3. The Definition of "Major Life Activity"
The term "major life activity" includes not only activities that have a public,
economic or daily aspect, but also private activities.67 Major life activities include
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing,
learning, and working.6s Sitting, standing, lifting and reaching are also considered
69major life activities. Mental and emotional processes such as thinking,
concentrating, interacting with others and reading are major life activities. 70 Driving
is not a major life activity under the ADA,71 but sleeping, an act which occupies one
third of life and which the majority of the population can perform with little or no
difficulty, is a major life activity.72
4. The Definition of "Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activity of
Working"
The term "substantially limited in the major life activity of working" is
specifically defined in the EEOC regulations." A person is substantially limited in
the major life activity of working if she is "significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities."74
A "class" of jobs is determined on a case by case basis.75 "Classroom teacher," for
example, is sufficiently broad to constitute a class ofjobs,76 but "airline pilot" is too
narrow a category of jobs to be considered a class because other non-piloting jobs
67. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (stating that private activities such as reproduction
are major life activities, and holding that asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA because it substantially
limits the major life activity of reproduction).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
69. Id.; see also Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that lifting is
a major life activity); McAlinden v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (establishing that
engaging in sexual relations, and interacting with others, are major life activities under the ADA). But see Soileau
v. Guilford of Maine, 105 F.3d 12, 15 (Ist Cir. 1997) (determining that "getting along with others" is perhaps too
amorphous a concept to be considered a major life activity).
70. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE ADA § 2.1(a) (1992) [hereinafter TAM] (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). But cf Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (determining that
depression was not disabling due to resulting difficulties in concentration, because concentration is not a major
life activity in itself but simply a component of a major life activity).
71. 29 C.FR. § 1613.702(c) (1999).
72. Pack, 166 F.3d at 1305.
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3) (1999).
74. Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999).
76. Mustafa v. Clark County Seb. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998); see also DePaoli v. Abbott
Lab., 140 F.3d 668, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1998) (asserting that assembly line work is a recognized class of jobs within
the scope of the ADA).
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are available to persons with similar training, skills, and experience.77 The language
"a broad range of jobs in various classes" is interpreted to mean the ability to
perform more than two jobs.78
The following factors are considered in determining if a person is substantially
limited in working: the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual
is disqualified; the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
and the individual's job training, experience, and expectations.79 A plaintiff seeking
recovery under the ADA is not required to provide a comprehensive list of jobs that
she cannot perform, but she must provide some specific evidence as to the type and
number ofjobs from which she is excluded.80 An analysis of substantial limitations
in working must focus on the employee's condition combined with her personal
situation, not speculation as to whether her restrictions would limit her employment
prospects if she possessed more or different training, skills, or abilities."' In sum,
finding that an individual is substantially limited in her ability to work requires a
basic showing that her overall employment opportunities are limited.2
C. The Second Prong of the Definition of Disability
The second prong of the definition of disability states that an individual with
a disability is one who has a "record of such an impairment."83 This language
identifies individuals who have a history of a mental or physical impairment that
has substantially limited a major life activity for a significant period of time."'
77. Witter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1370 (1 th Cir. 1998).
78. See Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a hemophiliac firefighter's
argument that his disqualification from being a firefighter or an Emergency Medical Technician substantially
limited him in the major life activity of working).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2j)(3)(ii) (1999); see also Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir.
1996) (stating that expertise, background, and job expectations are relevant in defining job classes used to
determine whether the person is disabled).
80. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Ricks v. Xerox
Corp., 877 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff failed to establish that he was
substantially limited in the major life activity of working because he produced no evidence about his level of
training, skills, and abilities; the geographical area to which he had access; or the number and type of jobs
demanding similar training from which he was disqualified).
81. See, e.g., Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778,784-85 (3d Cir. 1998) (remanding to
the district court the determination of whether a 55-year-old meat cutter with a sixth grade education who suffered
a back injury was substantially limited in the major life activity of working).
82. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Springfield, 146 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a police
dispatcher who failed a psychological test for police officer was not disabled, because her overall employment
opportunities were not limited).
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1999); see also Bender v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1997 WL 525186, at *4 (9th
Cir. July 14, 1997) (holding that a shoulder injury that did not prevent a truck driver from driving his truck was
not a record of a disability, because it was not substantially limiting); Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 .3d 1024, 1028
(5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that to establish a record of impairment, the disorder must substantially limit one of
life's major activities when active); Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 .3d 947, 953 (3d Cir. 1996) (same);
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Hospitalization alone is insufficient to establish a record of disability without a
history of substantial limitation in a major life activity.8 Even a letter from a doctor
to an employer restricting the employee's work activities is insufficient to establish
a record of an impairment, unless the letter describes an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.8
Second, an individual may have a record of a disability because some written
record misclassifies the individual as having an impairment that substantially limits
a major life activityY For example, an individual misclassified as learning disabled
is protected under the Act.88 Additionally, the definition covers an individual who
has recovered from cancer, heart disease, or mental illness but who is misclassified
by the employer because her medical records contain information regarding the
prior disability.89
An employer who relies on educational, medical, or employment records in
making an adverse employment decision about a person who is currently qualified
to perform ajob is subject to challenge for discriminatory practice.9° The plaintiff,
however, must prove that the employer both knew of the record and discriminated
because of that knowledge.9'
D. The Third Prong of the Definition of Disability
The third prong of the definition of a person with a disability includes those
individuals who are "regarded as" having an impairment which substantially limits
a major life activity.' This prong has three parts. First, an employee or applicant
is within the definition of an individual with a disability if the employee or
applicant has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit any
major life activities but the employee or applicant is treated by the employer as
having an impairment which does substantially limit a major life activity.93 For
example, an employee with high blood pressure, which does not substantially limit
Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35,37 (5th Cir. 1996) (same).
85. See, e.g., Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 317 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that employee's
temporary hospitalization for alcoholism does not establish a record of disability); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979
F.2d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 1992) (providing that temporary hospitalization is not a record of a disability); Colwell,
158 F.3d at 645-46 (same); Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898,901-02 (8th Cir. 1998> (same).
86. See, e.g., Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (determining that a doctor's letter
describing a lifting restriction was insufficient to establish a record of an impairment).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(k) (1999).
88. Id. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (1999).
89. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
90. 29 C.FR. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(k) (1999).
91. See Grinstead v. Pool Co. of Tex., 1994 WL 25515, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1994) (reasoning that an
employer cannot discriminate against an employee with a record of an impairment because of such impairment
if the employer had no knowledge of that impairment), affd, 26 F.3d 1118 (5th Cir. 1994).
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C) (West 1995).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1) (1999).
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her in a major life activity, qualifies as an individual with a disability under this
prong if her employer reassigns her to a less strenuous job because the employer
perceives that the impairment is substantially limiting.94 On the other hand, a welder
who is terminated cannot claim that the employer regarded him as substantially
limited in the major life activity of working if there is no evidence that company
officials had knowledge of the rumors of the welder having AIDS.95 Similarly, a
firefighter who has failed certain physical tests and is consequently dismissed from
his position is not regarded by his employer as being substantially limited in the
major life activity of working because he has only been disqualified from the job
of firefighter, which is a narrow job classification.'
Second, an employee or applicant is disabled under the third prong of the
definition of disability if the employee or applicant has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, but only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such an impairment. Thus, an employer may be liable for
taking adverse employment action based on the attitudes of others. For example, an
individual with a facial scar or bum, a nervous tic, a hearing aid, or cerebral palsy
may suffer adverse employment action due to the negative reactions of coworkers
or customers. The ADA protects such an individual as "disabled" under the third
prong.97 Likewise, a person who suffers adverse employment action due to HIV
positive status may qualify as an individual with a disability if the impairment is
substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others.98
Third, an individual is "disabled" under the Act if she has no impairment at all
but is treated by the employer "as having a substantially limiting impairment."99
The employer may have taken adverse action against the employee based on
mistake or rumor. For example, mistakes or rumors may lead an employer to the
erroneous belief that a person has a mental illness, cancer, or epilepsy. If the
employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action
against the employee, an inference can be drawn that the decision was based on
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(l) (1999); see also Riemer v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 148 F.3d 800,
806-07 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that an employer's refusal to reinstate an asthmatic fabrication shop worker
to a higher-paying indoor job because of unsubstantiated fears that his health would be jeopardized may be
sufficient to establish that the employee was "regarded as" disabled).
95. Rob-rts v. Unidynamics Corp., 126 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Runnebaum v.
NationsBank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156,174 (4th Cir. 1997) (asserting that a bank trust salesman with HIV
was not "regarded as" disabled because his employer's decision to fire him was made prior to learning of his
diagnosis).
96. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466,1474 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Collings v. Longview Fibre
Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to find that a drug addicted employee was "regarded as"
disabled when he was terminated from his employment; the employer did not perceive that he was substantially
limited in a major life activity, but only that his use and sale of drugs at work constituted a serious safety hazard
because of the large, fast-moving machinery at the plant).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (1999).
98. See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1322-23 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (remanding for
jury consideration whether an attorney was fired because some members of the law firm believed he had AIDS).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1999).
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mistake or rumort ° On the other hand, an employer would not be liable for
discrimination against an obese or an extremely short individual because these
impairments are not impairments that substantially limit a major life activity.1"'
E. An Individual with a Disability Must Be Able to Perform the Essential
Functions of the Job
The nondiscrimination requirements of Title I apply only to employees or
applicants with a disability who are qualified for the job.'0 A "qualified individual
with a disability" is defined as one "who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires."'' 03 The essential functions include job tasks
that are fundamental, as opposed to marginal.'0 4 The term "essential functions" is
defined as "the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual
with a disability holds or desires.'' °
In determining what job functions are fundamental, the employer's judgment
and the employer's written job description are evidence of the essential functions
of the job.' 6 However, a job description is not conclusive evidence and may be
rebutted by evidence tending to show that a certain duty is not in fact an essential
function.'07 Examples of job functions considered essential include attendance, '08
100. Id. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(l).
101. See supra Part IlI.B.2-3 (defining "substantially limiting" and"major life activity").
102. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1999).
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
104. H.R. REp. No. 101-485(11), at 55 (1990).
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(nX1) (1999).
106. 42 U.S.CA. § 12111(8) (West 1995).
107. See, e.g., Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (specifying that despite the fact
that the employer's job description listed frequent lifting of patients as an essential job function, an issue of fact
existed as to whether a nurse who could not lift more than 50 pounds was otherwise qualified for her position);
Heise v. Genuine Parts Co., 900 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (D. Minn. 1995) (observing that although customer contact
is essential in a sales job, an employee who periodically suffered severe headaches established a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the written job description, which required the employee to drive to the customers'
places of business on a daily basis, was followed by other employees).
108. Buckles v. First Data Resources, Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a credit card
purchase authorizer with acute rhinosinusitis who had excessive absences had not proved he could perform the
essential functions of the job).
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punctuality,'t 9 ability to work overtime,t t ability to work under an assigned
supervisor, "' and dealing appropriately with customers."'
A job function may be considered essential for several reasons. For example,
"It]he function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform
that function."'"3 The function may also be essential because a limited number of
employees are available to perform that job function." 4 Finally, the function may
be essential because it is so highly specialized that the incumbent in the position is
hired specifically for "her expertise or ability to perform the particular function.""15
Even after accurately delineating the essential functions of the job, an employer
must consider whether there are alternate ways an individual with a disability can
perform the essential tasks. Thus, determining whether an individual is qualified
involves an individualized inquiry into whether the person can perform the essential
functions of the job despite her disability, and if not, whether a reasonable
accommodation would enable the person to do so."1
6
1. The Definition of "Reasonable Accommodations"
An employer must make reasonable accommodations for the known physical
or mental limitations of a qualified person with a disability, unless such
accommodations "would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
[employer's] business.""' 7 An accommodation is a change in the work environment
or in the manner in which duties are accomplished that enables a qualified
individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." 8 Reasonable
accommodations include: making existing facilities readily accessible to individuals
with disabilities; job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules;
reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices; modification of examinations, training materials, or policies; and the
109. Hollestelle v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 1998 WL 228199, at *3 (4th Cir. May 8, 1998)
(indicating that property disposal technician who was tardy 96 times in eight months due to depression could not
perform the essential functions of the job).
110. Simmerman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3437, at *27 (ED. Pa. Mar. 25,1996),
aftd, 188 F 3d 1578 (3d Cir. 1998) (determining that an employee with clinical depression who insisted that he
could not work overtime had not demonstrated that he could perform the essential functions of the job).
I 11. Wemick v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 E3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that an employee
who insisted that she could not return to work because her supervisor exacerbated her back problems by making
her tense had not demonstrated that she could not perform the essential functions of the job).
112. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that an employee
with multiple sclerosis and depression who was fired for poor customer relations and errors in customer orders
had not demonstrated that she could perform the essential functions of the job).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i) (1999).
114. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii).
115. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii).
116. Id. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(n).
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 1995).
118. 29 C.F.R. §1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
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provision of qualified readers or interpreters. 1 9 Other reasonable accommodations
could include permitting the use of accrued paid leave for necessary treatment,
making employer-provided transportation accessible, providing personal assistants
such as a page turner or travel attendant, and providing reserved parking spaces. 2
However, employers are not required to provide accommodations which assist an
individual with a disability both on and off the job, such as prosthetic limbs,
wheelchairs, or eyeglasses.12 1
To determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, it may be
necessary for the employer to initiate an interactive process with the disabled
individual.'2 Some circuit courts have concluded that both the employer and the
employee have a duty to act in good faith and assist each other in the search for
appropriate reasonable accommodations.'2 In contrast, other circuits have
concluded that no such obligation on the part of the employer exists and that an
employer cannot be held independently liable under the ADA for simply failing to
engage in an interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations. 4
2. The Definition of "Undue Hardship"
If an employer can demonstrate that a particular job accommodation would
result in an "undue hardship" on the operation of its business, the ADA does not
require the employer to implement the accommodation.125 The term "undue
hardship" is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of the overall financial resources of the business, the number of
employees, and the type of operation."'
2 6
119. Id. § 1630.2(o)(ii).
120. Id. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(o).
121. Id. § 1630, app. § 1630.9.
122. Id. §1630.2(o)(3).
123. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (asserting that once
the employer knows of an employee's disability and the employee has requested accommodation, the employer's
obligation to participate in the interactive process has been triggered); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d
155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)
(reasoning that an employer that fails to communicate necessary accommodations, through initiation or response,
may be acting in bad faith).
124. See, e.g., Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 E3d 282,285 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (holding that the ADA does not
mandate a pretermination investigation of reasonable accommodations); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357,
363 (10th Cir. 1995) (providing that the EEOC recommendation of an interactive process is not a statutory
requirement).
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 1995).
126. Id. § 12111(10)(A)-(B); see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 142-43 (2d Cir.
1995) (establishing that providing a teacher with an assistant to help with classroom control may be a reasonable
accommodation if it does not unduly burden the school district budget).
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In general, a larger employer is expected to make accommodations requiring
greater effort or expense than would be required of a smaller employer."'
Moreover, evidence that the employer has made a particular accommodation in the
past may preclude the employer from claiming that the accommodation requested
by the employee constitutes an undue hardship.2 8 The impact on other employees,
however, may also be considered in determining whether an accommodation
constitutes an undue hardship. For example, in Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook
County,129 the employer was not required to retain an employee who threatened to
kill his supervisor. In that case, the employee demanded that the employer
accommodate his mental illness either by instructing other employees to put up with
his violent outbursts or by stationing guards to prevent the employee from getting
out of hand.130 The court held that such a demand was an undue hardship.1
3 1
F Remedies Under the ADA
Relief from violations of the ADA includes injunctive relief and back pay.
3 2
In cases of intentional discrimination, the equitable remedies of compensatory and
punitive damages are allowed and there is a right to a jury trial. 33 Future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other non-pecuniary losses are relevant to the calculation of compensatory
damages." Punitive damages are authorized if the employer acted "with malice or
with reckless indifference."' 35
LV. CONSIDERATION OF MITIGATING MEASURES IN THE DETERMINATION
OF WHETHER AN INDIVIDUAL HAS A DISABILITY
The first hurdle a plaintiff must surmount in an ADA discrimination action is
qualifying as an individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Qualification under the ADA requires a finding that the individual has an
127. TAM, supra note 70, § 3.9; see also Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 714, 722 (D. Colo.
1995) (holding that an employee's request for an assistant to perform physical tasks and for other employees to
conduct his field inspections may be a reasonable accommodation because the company had $40 million annual
gross sales).
128. See, e.g., Criado v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444-45 (1st Cir. 1998) (deciding
that an IBM marketing executive who suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder, anxiety disorder, and depression
was entitled to additional leave of absence, because employee "was not asking for more leave than would be
granted to a nondisabled, sick employee").
129. 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997).
130. Id. at 353.
131. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (West 1994).
133. Id. § 1981a(b).
134. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
135. Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
1144
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
"impairment that substantially limits one or more" major life activities. 136
According to the EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance, ' 1 37 "[the] determination of
whether [the] individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be
made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.' 38 However, these guidelines do not
have the force of either law or regulation, although they are based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
1 39
A. Prior Cases in Which Courts Did Not Consider Mitigating Measures in
Determining Whether an Individual Had a Disability
As litigation over ADA legislation reached the circuit court level, most circuit
courts cited the EEOC's guidelines to require that the determination of the extent
to which an impairment limits an individual's major life activities must be made
without regard to mitigating measures."4 For example, in Baert v. Euclid Beverage,
Ltd.,"4 the defendant claimed that because the plaintiff, a diabetic, was by his own
account healthy and unaffected by his condition in day to day activities, the plaintiff
did not have an impairment which substantially limited a major life activity. 142 The
court disagreed, stating that "the extent to which [an] impairment limits an
individual's major life activities" must be determined without regard to mitigating
measures. 143 A person with insulin-dependent diabetes, according to the court, is
substantially limited in major life activities because such a person would lapse into
a coma without medication. 144
In Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.,' 45 the court cited House
Education and Labor Committee Report,146 which specified that determining
136. l § 12102(2)(A); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (defining "substantially
limiting").
137. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that the EEOC published an appendix to its
regulations entitled "Interpretative Guidance" at the same time it published the regulations).
138. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999) (noting that mitigating measures include any action the
individual takes to correct the disabling condition).
139. Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,520-21 (11th Cir. 1996).
140. See 29 C.FR. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999) (indicating that the determination of whether or not an
individual has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity must be made without regard to
mitigating measures taken to correct the impairment); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.
1996) (noting that courts are not to consider mitigating measures in determining whether an individual is
disabled).
141. 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998).
142. Id. at 629.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 629-30; see also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1995) (providing that
insulin dependent diabetes constitutes a disability under the ADA without regard to whether it is controlled by
medication).
145. 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
146. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1U), at 52 (1990).
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whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to "mitigating
measures."' 4 The court noted that another report by the House Judiciary Committee
stated that mitigating measures should not be considered when determining whether
an individual has a disability.4" However, both committee reports differed from the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report, which directed that persons
with medical conditions that are under control do not have impairments that
currently limit major life activities. 49 Nevertheless, the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee Report agreed with the House Committee Reports'50 when
it stated that whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to
the availability of mitigating measures." The inconsistency in the Senate Report
led the court to believe that the Senate was suggesting that mitigating measures
should be considered in the determination of whether or not one was disabled under
the ADA.
15 2
While the court gave weight to the House Reports, the court also noted that the
most reasonable reading of the ADA was that mitigating measures must be taken
into account in considering whether one was "disabled" under the Act. 53 However,
the court was reluctant to ignore legislative history and the EEOC guidelines which
dictated the opposite result.'5' The court finally reasoned that it would consider the
unmitigated state of a condition only for serious impairments, such as diabetes,
epilepsy, and hearing impairments, and only if the condition required the individual
to mitigate on a frequent basis.' 55
The ability to self-correct an impairment is another mitigating measure that
courts have declined to consider in determining whether an individual is disabled.
In Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,'m the plaintiff claimed that
her dyslexia was a disability for which the New York State Bar must accommodate
by providing special testing procedures for the state bar exam.'57 The plaintiff had
earned a Ph.D. in Educational Administration from New York University and a law
degree from Vermont Law School.158 The court held that a person's ability to self-
accommodate a learning disability does not foreclose a finding of disability.
147. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1998).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 28 (1990) (stating that the impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures would result in a less-than-substantial limitation).
149. Id. at 24.
150. Supra notes 146, 148.
151. Id. at 23.
152. Washington, 152 F.3d at 468.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 469.
155. Id. at 470. But cf. Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
determination of whether a corrected visual impairment such as strabismus substantially limits a major life activity
must be made without regard to mitigating measures).
156. 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 325.
158. Id. at 324.
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Although the plaintiff had generally competent reading skills as compared to the
average reader, her success was due to her history of self-accommodation-a
mitigating measure that did not prevent the plaintiff from qualifying as "disabled"
under the ADA. 59
In Harris v. H & W Contracting Co.,' 6" the plaintiff had Graves disease, "an
endocrine disorder affecting the thyroid gland." The condition was controlled by
medication and did not interfere with the plaintiff's work or other life activities.
61
However, due to a change in the drug's manufacturing process, which caused an
overdose of the medication, the plaintiff was hospitalized for a psychiatric
disorder.162 She was subsequently fired from her position, an action she claimed was
due to her "disability." 163 The court admitted that it is difficult to understand "how
a condition that is completely controlled by medication can substantially limit a
major life activity."'" The court noted that the "Interpretative Guidance" provided
by the EEOC in the appendix to the federal regulations is not law." Nevertheless,
the court relied on the EEOC's interpretation, as well as legislative history, in its
holding that the plaintiff's mitigating measures could not be considered in
determining whether she qualified as an individual with a disability. te
B. Prior Cases in Which Courts Considered Mitigating Measures in
Determining Whether an Individual Had a Disability
Despite the EEOC guidelines and the legislative history, a number of courts did
take mitigating measures into account when determining whether an individual is
qualified as "disabled" under the ADA. For example, in Ellison v. Software
Spectrum Inc.,' 67 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the issue of whether
mitigating measures should be considered in the determination of whether a
disability substantially impairs a major life activity.16' The court stated that if
159. Id. at 329; see also Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
policeman who had been fired because he became blind in one eye was substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing and thus entitled to the ADA's protection; although his disability did not prevent him from
performing the essential functions of the job because his brain made subconscious adjustments to compensate for
the lack of peripheral vision, the courts should not consider mitigating measures in the determination of whether
or not a person was disabled).
160. 102 F.3d 516 (llth Cir. 1996).
161. Id. at 517.
162. Id. at 518.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 520.
165. Id. at 521.
166. Id.
167. 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
168. Id. at 191 n.3.
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Congress had intended that the determination be made without regard to mitigating
measures, it would have so provided in the definition of disability.' 69
In Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 70 the plaintiff, an inspection supervisor,
contended that she was a person with a disability under the ADA, because her
insulin dependent diabetes prevented her from passing a vision test, resulting in her
removal from the supervisor position.'17 The court noted that the EEOC guidelines
are not binding regulations, but simply a statement of the agency's interpretation
of the statute. 72 The court determined that "in this instance the EEOC's
interpretation [was] in direct conflict with the language of the statute," requiring the
plaintiff to show that an impairment substantially limited a major life activity.7
The court reasoned that the plaintiff's impairment, as mitigated by insulin, only
rendered her unable to perform a narrow range of production work; thus, she failed
to adduce the facts necessary to meet her threshold burden of establishing that she
was disabled.
174
A similar result was reached in Gaddy v. Four B Corp.175 The plaintiff asserted
that the defendant discriminated against her when it terminated her because her
asthma prevented her from retrieving carts from the store's parking lot. 76 The court
reasoned "that the plaintiffs asthma should be evaluated in its medicated state."'
77
The plaintiff successfully controlled her asthma with an inhaler; thus, the condition
did not substantially limit the major life activity of breathing. 78 The court
concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled within the definition of the ADA.
179
In Cline v. Fort Howard Corp.,a ° the court decided that the use of assistive
devices should be considered in the evaluation of whether an individual is disabled
under the ADA. 8' However, the court recognized the split of authority on this issue
and restricted its holding to the context of vision disabilities, which can be
mitigated by corrective lenses to the extent that the person is not substantially
limited in a major life activity.'82
169. Id.
170. 928 F. Supp. 1437 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
171. Id. at 1441.
172. Id. at 1444 (citing Coghlan v. HJ. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Tex. 1994)).
173. Id. at 1445.
174. Id. at 1448; see also Moore v. City of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan. 1996)
(concluding that insulin controlled diabetes was not an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity);
Coghlan v. HJ. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
175. 953 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1997).
176. Id. at 333.
177. Id. at 337.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 963 F. Supp. 1075 (F.D. Okla. 1997).
181. Id. at 1080 n.6.
182. Id. at 1081.
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The disagreement among the courts as to whether mitigating measures should
be considered in the determination of whether an individual is "disabled" under the
ADA set the stage for clarification of the issue by the United States Supreme Court.
This clarification was provided in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
83
V. SUTTON V. UNiTED AIR LINES, INC.
A. The Facts of the Case
Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton were severely myopic identical twin sisters
who applied to United Air Lines (United) to become commercial airline pilots. 84
They were experienced commercial airline pilots, licensed by the Federal Aviation
Administration to fly any class of passenger airplane.'85 Each sister's visual acuity
was 20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye.1 6 With the
use of corrective lenses, each had 20/20 vision.' 87 The life-long goal of both twins
was to fly for a major global air carrier.11
8
United's minimum uncorrected vision requirement was 20/100 or better, a
standard that was modeled on military requirements for pilot training. 8 9 United
refused to consider the twins' applications for employment as pilots because their
vision failed to meet United's standards for visual acuity.' 90
The plaintiffs claimed that they qualified as disabled under the ADA because
due to their severe myopia they had an impairment which substantially limited them
in the major life activity of working as airline pilots for a major global carrier.19'
The class ofjobs from which they were excluded included all of United's thousands
of piloting positions, without regard to aircraft model, route, or flying conditions. 92
They further contended that United regarded them as disabled, because although
they were able to work as pilots, United regarded them as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working as pilots.' 93 The plaintiffs alleged that United's
policy regarding uncorrected vision requirements was unsupported by legitimate
safety concerns and was based on myth, fear, and stereotype.' 94
183. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
184. Id. at 475.
185. Petitioners' Brief at 3, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
186. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Respondent's Brief at 1, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Supra note 185, at 5.
193. Supra note 185, at 5.
194. Supra note 185, at 4-5.
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B. The Court's Decision
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the court. The opinion encompassed
two claims: (1) the plaintiffs' claim that they met the ADA's definition of
individuals with disabilities, i.e., that they had a physical impairment which
substantially limited them in a major life activity; and (2) the plaintiffs' claim that
United regarded them as disabled.
1. The Court's Decision Regarding the Plaintiffs' Claim of Disability
Under the ADA
The Court held that if a person has taken measures to mitigate a physical or
mental impairment, the positive and negative effects of those measures must be
considered when determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major
life activity.195 The Court based its decision on three separate provisions of the
ADA.
First, the Court examined the language of the Act defining disability as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual."' 96 The Court noted that "limits" was a present
indicative verb, denoting that the impairment limits a major life activity now, not
that it might or could limit a major life activity at some indefinite point in the
future.' 97 Thus, a person whose disability is corrected by medicine or other
measures does not have a disability that substantially "limits"-in the present-a
major life activity. 198
Second, the Court scrutinized the ADA's definition of disability, which requires
that disabilities and their consequent impairments be evaluated "with respect to an
individual."' 99 The Court noted that if an employer were to follow the EEOC
guidelines in evaluating an individual's disability in its unmitigated state, she would
be essentially forced to make a disability determination based on general
information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects people.200 For
example, the employer faced with a diabetic employee whose diabetes is under
insulin control would need to determine whether unmitigated diabetes, in the
general population, represents a substantial limitation of a major life activity.201
Under this view, all diabetics would be disabled.202 Thus, the EEOC guidelines
195. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
196. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1995).
197. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
198. Id. at 483.
199. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 1995).
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create a system in which disabled persons with the same impairment are treated as
members of a group, rather than individuals. This system is "contrary to both the
letter and the spirit of the ADA." 203
Third, the Court examined the legislative findings enacted as part of the ADA
and concluded that Congress did not intend to bring under the statute's protection
all those individuals whose unmitigated conditions could fit the ADA definition of
"disability." 2 4 The legislative findings include the assertion that 43 million
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, 5 a figure which the
Court assumed was derived from a 1988 report issued by the National Council on
Disability titled "On the Threshold of Independence." 206 This report stated that 37.3
million noninstitutionalized individuals over the age of fifteen have a functional
limitation on performing certain basic activities such as seeing, hearing, speaking,
working, or getting around.2° The Court surmised that the difference between the
37.3 million and 43 million figures could probably be explained as an effort to
include in the findings those who were excluded from the National Council
figure.203 The Court also cited the estimate of Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
that approximately 31.4 million civilian noninstitutionalized persons have chronic
activity limitations,209 and the 1989 Statistical Abstract estimate that 32.7 million
noninstitutionalized persons had activity limitations in 1985. °
The Court reasoned that if Congress had meant to include in the ADA definition
of "disabled" all those individuals whose conditions were mitigated, the legislative
findings would have included significantly higher numbers.2 ' For example, the
Court estimated that the number of people with vision impairments alone is 100
million;2 2 while more than 28 million Americans have impaired hearing,"3 and
approximately 50 million people have high blood pressure.214 Thus, the Court
203. Id. at 484.
204. Id.
205. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
206. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485; see also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF
INDEPENDENCE (1988) (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http.//www.ncd.gov> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (estimating that there were 37.3 million disabled individuals in the United States).
207. NATIONALCOUNCILONDISABmy, ONTHETHRESHOLDOFINDEPENDENCE (1988) (visited December
22, 1999) <http./www.ncd.gov> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
208. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486.
209. Id. (citing MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., DIGEST OF DATA ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
25(1984)).
210. Id. (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 115 (1989)).
211. Id. at 487.
212. Id. (citing NATIONALADVISORYEYECOUNCIL, U.S. DEPARTMENTOFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
VISION RESEARCH-A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003,7 (1998)).
213. Id. (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, NATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH PLAN: HEARING AND
HEARING IMPAIRMENT (1996)).
214. Id. (citing Bailliere Tindall, Stalking a Silent Killer: Hypertension, Business & Health 57 (August
1998)).
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reasoned, a legislative finding that 43 million Americans are disabled is evidence
that Congress intended the ADA's coverage to be restricted to those whose
impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.2"'
The Court clarified that the use of corrective measures does not, in itself,
preclude coverage under the ADA.216 One could, for example, use a prosthetic foot
and still be substantially limited in the major life activity of running.2 7 Individuals
who take medicine to lessen the symptoms of a disability may still remain
substantially limited.21 8 Furthermore, a person who has taken mitigating measures
to correct a disability may still be "regarded as" disabled by the employer, and thus
may qualify as an individual with a disability under the third prong of the definition
of disabled.219
2. The Court's Decision Regarding the Plaintiffs' Claim That They Were
"RegardedAs" Substantially Limited in the Major Life Activity of Working
The plaintiffs alleged that United believed that their vision impairment
substantially limited them in the major life activity of working, and further, that the
vision requirement was based on myth and stereotype. " This claim necessarily
rested on the plaintiffs' assertion that the position of global airline pilot is a class
of employment."'
The Court cited the EEOC's regulations, which indicate that the inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the
major life activity of working.m These regulations identify several factors that
courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working, including the geographical area to
which the individual has reasonable access, and the number and types of jobs
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities from which the individual
is disqualified. m The Court noted that in order to be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working, "one must be precluded from more than one type of
job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice." Because the position of
global airline pilot is a single job, not a class of jobs, the Court held that the
plaintiffs had not supported their claim that United regarded them as substantially
215. Id.




220. Id. at 490.
221. Id.; see also supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the definition of "substantially limited in the major life
activity of working").
222. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)).
223. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)XA), (B) (1999).
224. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
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limited in the major life activity of working.2 A number of similar jobs, such as
regional pilot and pilot instructor, were open to the plaintiffs.2 6 Moreover, the
Court pointed out that the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance in the appendix to the
regulations addresses similar facts: "[Ain individual who cannot be a commercial
airline pilot.., but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier
service, would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working." 7
3. The Court Questions the Authority of the EEOC to Promulgate Regulations
Regarding the Definition of Disabled
The Court noted that Congress granted the EEOC authority to issue regulations
to carry out the employment provisions of Title I of the ADA, sections 12111
through 12117, pursuant to section 12116.m Although the Court emphasized that
no agency had been authorized to issue regulations implementing section 12102,
which provides the ADA's definition of "disabled," the Court did not consider what
deference was due these regulationsm m Both parties accepted the regulations as
valid and the determination of their validity was not necessary to decide the case.30
The Court also pointed out the conceptual difficulty of the EEOC regulation
which includes working as a major life activity.23 The Court noted that even the
EEOC was reluctant to include working in the definition of a "major life
activity." 32 The EEOC guidelines indicate that working should be viewed as a
residual life activity, to be used only if no other major life activity is substantially
limited. 3
4. The Court Questions the Authority of the EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance"
The Court also questioned the authority of the EEOC's guidelines for
implementation of Title I of the ADA, which were published at the same time as its
regulations.23 The Court observed that the EEOC's requirement that the
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made without regard to mitigating measures was not included in
225. Id. at 493.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999)).
228. Id. at 478.
229. Id. at 479.
230. Id at 480.
231. ld. at 492; see also infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulties inherent in
including working as a major life activity).
232. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999)).
233. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2() (1999).
234. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (referring to the EEOC's appendix to its ADA regulations, entitled
"Interpretive Guidance").
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its regulations.235 Instead, the requirement appears in the separate "Interpretive
Guidance" which was issued as an appendix to the regulations.' 6 The Court noted
that the persuasive force of these guidelines was a question in the case. However,
the Court did not decide what deference was due the guidelines because this case
could be decided based on the plain meaning of the statutory language without
reference to the guidelines. 
37
C. Justice Ginsburg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsburg submitted a concurring opinion in which she observed that the
legislative finding that 43 million Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities is a strong clue that the definition of disability was not meant to include
those individuals with correctable conditions?28 She noted Congress' emphasis on
the fact that individuals with disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority" with
a history of unequal treatment and political powerlessness.239 She reasoned that
people with mitigated disabilities are in no sense a discrete and insular minority, nor
are they historic victims of discrimination who are politically powerless.240 Thus,
according to Justice Ginsburg, Congress must have intended to restrict the ADA's
coverage to the disabled whose impairments are not mitigated. 24'
D. The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stevens, Joined by Justice Breyer
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and Justice
Breyer. Although he agreed that Congress did not intend to include every person
who wears glasses as a member of a "discrete and insular minority," Justice Stevens
argued that the customary tools of statutory construction demonstrate that
mitigating measures were not to be considered in determining whether a person was
"disabled" under the Act.
242
First, Justice Stevens noted that the task of statutory construction is to interpret
the statute's wording in light of the purpose of the statute.243 The purpose of the
ADA, as set forth by Congress, is to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."244 According to Justice Stevens, the three parts of the definition of
235. Id. at 480.
236. Id.
237. id.
238. ld. at 494.
239. id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(aX7) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000)).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 495.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 496.
244. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
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disability--"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits" a major life
activity, "a record of such... impairment," or being regarded as having such an
impairmene 4 -- were not meant to be discrete categories, but rather overlapping
formulas. 246 Justice Stevens found that, under the majority's reasoning, a person is
disabled only when her present condition substantially impairs a major life activity,
when she has a past record of such a condition, or when she is regarded as having
such a condition.2 7 Thus, a person who has surgically corrected a serious hearing
impairment is "disabled" under the second prong of the definition, while one who
wears a hearing aid is not "disabled." 2" Justice Stevens found the result "bizarre"
that the definition could include fully cured impairments, but exclude impairments
that are merely treatable. 249
Second, Justice Stevens observed that any ambiguity in the meaning of
statutory text can be easily resolved by reviewing the legislative history of the
ADA.25 The Senate Report stated that "whether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures."' ' The Report
explained that employers often discriminate against people with medical conditions
such as epilepsy or diabetes, which can be controlled by medication." These
individuals would fit the third prong of the definition, because although their
disability was mitigated, they were "regarded as" disabled by their employers . 3
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, the Senate Report confirms the intent of
Congress to disregard mitigating measures in assessing disability.
Justice Stevens further pointed out that the House of Representatives clarified
that unmitigated correctable disabilities were also to be considered in the first prong
of the definition.' The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary states that,
in considering the first prong of the definition, the impairment should be assessed
without regard to mitigating measures.5 5 Thus, according to the House Report,
persons with epilepsy controlled by medication, as well as persons with hearing
aids, are considered persons with a disability under the Act.z 6
Third, Justice Stevens stressed that the executive agencies charged with the
responsibility of implementing the Act have consistently interpreted the Act as
mandating that mitigating measures must not be considered in determining whether
245. Id. § 12102(2) (West 1995).
246. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 497.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 498-99.
249. Id. at 499.
250. Id.
251. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 24.
254. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500.
255. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(m), at 28 (1990).
256. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500.
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an individual is disabled.257 The Court has traditionally respected agency
interpretations of statutes,25 and has specifically done so in regard to the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA.2 9
Justice Stevens observed that, even if the Court classified the plaintiffs as
disabled, the plaintiffs must prove they could perform the essential functions of a
commercial airline pilot in order to prevail on their claim of discrimination. 2 ° Once
these facts were proven, United Air Lines would still prevail if it could demonstrate
that having uncorrected visual acuity of at least 20/100 is job-related and consistent
with business necessity or safety concerns.26
Justice Stevens noted that remedial legislation is generally construed broadly
in order to effectuate its purpose. 2 The Court has commonly interpreted remedial
statutes to cover individuals or discriminatory conduct that was not within
Congress' immediate concern when passing the legislation in order to include
"comparable evils."" For example, although Congress focused on the problem of
discrimination against African-Americans when it enacted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Court construed the statute to apply to all minority groups
as well as to Caucasians.2" Title VIH's prohibition against sexual harassment was
interpreted by the Court to include same-sex sexual harassment.265 Justice Stevens
asserted that the practice of broad construction of remedial statutes should continue
in this case and the plaintiffs should be considered to be within the definition of
disabled.
2 "
Justice Stevens was particularly disturbed by the majority's use as a rationale
for its decision that the ADA requires an employer to look at each individual as an
individual.267 Although Justice Stevens agreed that the ADA requires an
individualized approach, he disputed that the majority's decision was in fact an
individualized approach, because the decision will deny ADA protection to all
persons who, for example, have diabetes controlled by medication or who function
effectively with a prosthetic limb.2" Under the majority's interpretation, these
individuals will no longer be considered disabled and thus will be denied the
protection of the ADA.2
257. Idat 501.
258. Id. (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mihollin, 444 U.S. 555,566 (1980)).
259. Id. at 502 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)).
260. L. at 504
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 505.
264. Id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976)).
265. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998)).
266. Id. at 506.
267. Id. at 508-509
268. See id. at 509 indicating that the majority's approach in fact treated people as groups, allowing
employers to refuse to hire every person, for example, who has diabetes which is controlled by medication).
269. Id.
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E. Justice Breyer's Separate Dissent
Justice Breyer, writing in a separate dissent, suggested that the EEOC develop
regulations distinguishing between those whom Congress may not have wanted to
protect, such as those who wear eyeglasses, and those whom Congress did want to
protect.7 Justice Breyer also asserted that Congress would not have wanted to deny
the EEOC the authority to issue regulations regarding the definition of the term
"disability," because Title I of the ADA includes this term, and the definitional
regulations were the foundation of the other EEOC regulations.
271
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
The Court's decision in Sutton was contrary to the decisions of all of the circuit
courts, except the Fifth and Tenth, that had dealt with the question of whether to
consider mitigating measures in determining whether a plaintiff qualifies as an
individual with a disability. 27 The ramifications of the decision include: (1)
significantly limiting the class of individuals who now qualify as individuals with
disabilities;273 (2) encouraging arguments on the part of litigants that the court
should disregard the EEOC's definitions of terms for the ADA's section 12102(2)
defining disability;z74 and (3) encouraging arguments on the part of litigants that the
court should disregard the EEOC's "Interpretative Guidance.
A. Impact on the Class of Individuals with a Disability as Defined by the ADA
The Court's definition of an individual with a disability as one whose
impairment presently substantially limits a major life activity will impact all three
prongs of the definition of "disability."'2 76 The first prong will suffer the greatest
impact, narrowing the class of individuals who qualify as disabled.277 The decision
will result in a lesser impact on the second prong of the definition,278 and a greater
use by future plaintiffs of the third prong.279
270. Id. at 514.
271. Id. at 514-15.
272. See supra Part IV.A-B (detailing prior court decisions regarding the consideration of mitigating
measures).
273. Infra Part VI.A.
274. Infra Part VI.B.
275. Infra Part VI.C.
276. See supra Part l1I.B-D (explaining the three prongs of the definition of disability).
277. Infra Part VI.A.I.
278. Infra Part VI.A.2.
279. Infra Part VI.A.3.
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1. Limiting the Class of Individuals with a Disability Under the First Prong
of the Definition of Disability
The first prong of the definition of disability states that an individual with a
disability is one who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities. 210 By interpreting the definition of "disability" as
excluding those whose impairments have been mitigated and who are not presently
substantially limited in a major life activity, the Court has significantly narrowed
the class of individuals who may claim the ADA's protection under this prong.
"Substantially limits" now denotes only conditions which are substantially limiting
at the time the adverse employment decision is made.21 Conditions which are
controlled by medication, such as diabetes, epilepsy, and high blood pressure, will
no longer qualify as impairments which substantially limit a major life activity.282
An employee or applicant suffering from these or similar conditions will not be able
to claim discrimination on the basis of a disability. Thus, many plaintiffs who may
have been successful under the ADA prior to Sutton will no longer qualify to bring
suit.211
The picture is less clear for employees or applicants who have a recurring
condition which is temporarily controlled by medication, but which is likely to flare
up at some point in the future. However, following the Court's emphasis on
"present" conditions, it is likely that those individuals whose chronic condition is
presently mitigated by medication would not be considered substantially limited in
a major life activity. If the adverse employment action occurred during a period of
time when the condition was under control, the employer would probably not be
liable for discrimination on the basis of disability because, after the Sutton decision,
a disability must be an impairment which substantially limits a major life activity
at the time the adverse employment action is taken.
As a result of the Sutton decision, the plaintiff's current physical or mental
condition has acquired a great deal of importance in ADA litigation. Medical or
psychological examinations completed at or around the time of the alleged adverse
employment action may be critical to the determination of an ADA case.
2. Limiting the Class of Individuals with a Disability Under the Second Prong
of the Definition of Disability
The second prong of the definition of an individual with a disability pertains to
a person who has a record of having a physical or mental impairment that
280. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1995).
281. Supra note 195 and accompanying text.
282. Supra note 198 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., supra notes 141, 156, 160 and accompanying text (providing examples of plaintiffs whose
disability had been mitigated but who qualified as "disabled" under the Act).
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substantially limits a major life activity.2s Plaintiffs utilize this prong the least
because it is generally unsuccessful.285 The Sutton Court's definition of disability
now limits this prong to records of past impairments which were substantially
limiting in a major life activity at the time of their occurrence.8 6 Thus, records of
conditions controlled by medication or otherwise mitigated no longer qualify the
individual as a member of the class of individuals with a disability.
Plaintiffs will continue to prevail, however, if the impairment was substantially
limiting in a major life activity and they can demonstrate that the employer took
action based on the record of the impairment. For example, the denial of a
promotion due to a record of heart disease would be a successful ADA action,
provided that the heart disease substantially limited the plaintiff in a major life
activity at the time it occurred.
3. Increased Future Use of the Third Prong of the Definition of Disability
The third prong of the definition of an individual with a disability includes
individuals who are "regarded as" having a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity." As interpreted by the EEOC, this prong
has three meanings: (1) the person has an impairment which does not substantially
limit a major life activity but is regarded by the employer as if she does have such
an impairment; (2) the person has an impairment which substantially limits a major
life activity, but only as a result of myths, stereotypes, and the negative attitudes of
others; or (3) the person has no impairment, but as a result of rumor or mistake, she
is treated as if she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
288
The first part of this prong of the definition of disability could become the
subject of increased attention in the future. The Sutton Court itself pointed out that
although the Court's decision foreclosed those whose conditions, such as diabetes,
are controlled by medication from being included in the class of disabled, the
employee may still qualify as a member of the class if she is regarded by the
employer as substantially limited in a major life activity.289 For example, if the
employer actually regards epilepsy, diabetes, or high blood pressure as presently
substantially limiting in a major life activity, and takes adverse employment action
based on that belief, courts may determine that the plaintiff is a member of the
protected class. This interpretation of the Sutton decision is consistent with the
284. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
285. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing cases wherein plaintiffs argued
discrimination on part of employers using the second prong of the definition of disability).
286. See supra Part V.B.l (explaining the Court's decision that if a disability is mitigated, it is not
substantially limiting).
287. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
288. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (1999).
289. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
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language of the statute because "regarded as" implies that this prong of the
definition refers not to the actual limitations of an impairment, but what the
employer believes is true regarding that impairment.
210
The difficulty for the plaintiff in a "regarded as" case will continue to be
proving both that the employer believed that the impairment was substantially
limiting in a major life activity and that the employer took adverse action based on
that belief. The proof of what another believed is a heavy burden for the plaintiff.
For instance, if the defendant can articulate any non-discriminatory reason for the
action, the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed under the third prong.29'
B. Questioning the Authority of the EEOC's Regulations Defining the Terms in
the Statutory Definition of "Disability"
The Sutton Court pointed out, in dicta, that the EEOC had been authorized by
Congress to develop regulations only for the implementation of the employment
sections of the ADA.292 Neither the EEOC, nor any other agency, had been given
authority to amplify the definition of disability contained in section 12102(2).93
The Court has thus opened the door to future arguments that the EEOC regulations
defining the terms in this definition are not binding on the courts.
The EEOC amplified the statutory definition of disability by defining the
following terms: "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits," "major
life activity," "substantially limited in the major life activity of working," "having
a record of," and "regarded as." If the EEOC does not have authority to define
these terms, the terms retain only their plain meaning in the language of the
statute. 95 Thus, the courts are free to determine for themselves the plain meaning
of the terms.
Disregarding the authority of the EEOC's definitions of some of these terms
will probably have little impact on future ADA decisions. For example, the EEOC's
amplification and explanation of the term "physical or mental impairment
2 96
simply provides examples of conditions which could be disabilities if they were
substantially limiting in a major life activity. The definition of "substantially limits"
provides a parameter against which to evaluate whether the condition is truly
290. See supra Part IIH.D (explaining the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability).
291. See supra note 50 (noting that the plaintiff must show that the employer has discriminated because of
her disability).
292. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
293. Id.
294. 29 C.R. § 1630.2(h)-(i) (1999).
295. See United States v. Lewis, 67 E3d 225, 228 (1995) (stating that if the language of a statute is clear,
the court looks no further than that language in determining the statute's meaning).
296. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
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substantially limiting. 7 The regulation regarding major life activities does not
define major life activity, but simply lists examples of major life activities. 298
However, the inclusion of "working" in the EEOC's list of examples of major
life activities was itself of particular concern to the Sutton court and thus may be
a subject of future contention regarding the appropriateness of its inclusion as a
major life activity. The Court observed that defining "major life activity" to include
working has the potential to make the ADA circular.2' The stronger the evidence
that an employee or applicant cannot work, the less likely that the individual will
be covered by the Act because the person who cannot work cannot perform the
essential functions of a job. The EEOC itself realized this flaw in its regulations,
indicating in the appendix that the individual's ability to perform the major life
activity of working should be considered only if the individual is not substantially
limited in any other major life activity.3" By pointing out the difficulty of logically
applying the concept of "major life activity" to "working,"' ' the Sutton Court has
offered defense attorneys the opportunity to make a strong case for disregarding,
if not all of the regulations surrounding the definition of "disability," at least those
regulations that define working as a "major life activity."
The EEOC's definition of "having a record of" will probably not be questioned
in the future because the regulation merely defines this prong as having "a history
of" a disability that substantially limits a major life activity. 2 However, the
EEOC's definition of "regarded as, 303 does have the potential for future
controversy. The first and third parts of the "regarded as" definition accord with the
plain meaning of the statute-an individual is regarded as having a disability if she
either has an impairment which does not substantially limit a major life activity or
has no impairment at all, but is treated by the employer as if she does have such an
impairment. 3° However, the second part of the EEOC's definition allows a plaintiff
to initiate an ADA action based not on the employer's belief or attitudes, but on the
attitudes of others.0 5 Thus, attitudes of coworkers or customers may generate
employer liability. 6 As a result, this section of the third prong extends the meaning
of "regarded as" beyond the plain meaning of the statute by requiring employers to
bear the burden of others' attitudes. Therefore, this part of the definition of
"regarded as" may well be a point of contention in the future.
297. Id. § 1630.20).
298. Id. § 1630.20).
299. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
300. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999).
301. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
302. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1999).
303. Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)-(3).
304. Id. § 1630.2(l)(I),(3).
305. Id. § 1630.20)(2).
306. Supra Part ID.
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C. Questioning the Validity of the EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance"
The Sutton Court not only specifically overruled the EEOC's mandate that the
determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity must be made without regard to mitigating measures, 7 but it also called
into question the persuasive force of the entire "Interpretive Guidance"
303
containing this mandate. According to the Court, the "Interpretive Guidance"
guidelines are not regulations promulgated under the authority of Congress.30
Furthermore, courts may accord guidelines less weight than regulations.3t0 Thus, the
EEOC's guidelines may, in the future, be accorded even less weight in the courts.
This result may have a fairly substantial impact on how future cases are
decided. For the most part, the "Interpretive Guidance" provides straightforward
and common sense amplifications of the regulations based on the Senate and House
of Representative Reports on the statute,3 ' as well as helpful illustrations.
32
However, the "Interpretive Guidance" does move beyond the regulations in some
instances. Of course, the most outstanding example is the mandate in the
"Interpretive Guidance" that mitigating measures must not be considered in
determining whether a person has a disability that substantially limits a major life
activity.
13
The guidelines also reach beyond the regulations to include sitting, standing,
lifting and reaching as examples of major life activities.1 4 Courts may decide, in
the future, that some or all of these activities are not major life activities.
Furthermore, the guidelines include "heavy lifting" as a class of jobs,1 5 giving
some indication of the narrowness of the EEOC's interpretation of a "class." In the
future, courts may determine that a "class" ought to be interpreted more broadly.
For example, future courts may interpret a "class of jobs" to mean the general
category of manual labor jobs, not a specific category of jobs that require heavy
lifting. This would further narrow the class of individuals who could qualify as an
307. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
308. Id. at 480.
309. See Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (stating that the
EEDC's mandate is not binding on the court).
310. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
311. See, e.g., 29 C.ER. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(b)-(c) (1999) (noting that the House Labor Report and the
House Judiciary Report indicate that employers must meet the standard of the ADA despite lower standards in
other laws); id. § 1630.2(h) (recognizing that the Senate Report, the House Labor Report, and the House Judiciary
Report provide that various medical conditions associated with age do constitute impairments).
312. See, e.g., id. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999) (using the example of a commercial airline pilot with
vision impairment as an illustration of an individual who is not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, and a person with a back injury who cannot do heavy lifting as an example of a person who is
substantially limited in the major life activity of working).
313. Id. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(h).
314. Id. § 1630.2(i).
315. Id. § 1630.2Q).
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individual with a disability under the ADA's definition because fewer individuals
would qualify as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
In addition, the guidelines state that HIV infection is inherently substantially
limiting. 6 This is contradictory to the Sutton decision, in which the Court held that
an impairment is only substantially limiting if it presently substantially limits a
major life activity.317 A person with asymptomatic HIV infection is not presently
limited in a major life activity. Thus, this guideline is obviously contrary to the
Court's decision and should not be followed in the future.
The guidelines' implication that obesity is generally not substantially limiting18
may also be contrary to the Court's decision in Sutton. Obesity is an impairment
because it affects the respiratory system, and may substantially limit the major life
activities of walking and running.319 Thus, future courts may find that, as a general
rule, obesity qualifies the individual to meet the ADA definition of disabled.
Moreover, the "Interpretive Guidance" proclaims that, in determining what is
an essential function of a job, courts should not second guess an employer's
business decisions regarding the appropriate production standards for a job.3 2' The
"Interpretive Guidance" points to typing speed and the number of rooms to be
cleaned in a day as examples of production standards.3 2' As a result of the Sutton
decision, future courts may be inclined to disregard these guidelines and instead
require employers to offer business necessity reasons for all production standards.
If the employer could not prove such business necessity, the court may determine
that the production standard in question is not an essential function of the job.
The "reasonable accommodations" section of the guidelines details the process
of consultation that the employer should engage in with the employee to determine
what is a reasonable accommodation.3" If future courts question the validity of the
"Interpretive Guidance," they may decide that such consultation is unnecessary.
The guidelines further require the employer to consider the preference of the
employee for a particular accommodation. 3 3 A court that views the guidelines as
merely suggestions for the employer's conduct would not necessarily concern itself
with whether the employer considered the employee's preference.
The "Interpretive Guidance" also states that reassignment of an individual with
a disability should be considered only when accommodation within the individual's
316. Id. § 1630.2(j).
317. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
318. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999).
319. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDEINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION,
AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS vii (1998) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (noting that obesity raises the risk of morbidity from respiratory problems and well as a number of other
health problems).
320. 20 C.F.RL § 1630.2(n) (1999).
321. Id.
322. Id. § 1630.9 (1999).
323. Id.
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current position would pose an undue hardship." '324 If this provision is disregarded
by the courts in the future, employers will be free to reassign employees with
disabilities without proving that reasonable accommodation in the present position
is an undue hardship.
Finally, the guidelines prohibit employers from claiming that negative impact
on the morale of other employees as a result of an accommodation constitutes
"undue hardship.' '325 This prohibition ignores the fact that low morale may
contribute to low productivity. From an employer's perspective, an accommodation
that has a substantial negative impact on the morale of other employees may not be
a reasonable accommodation. In the future, Sutton will lend weight to arguments
that the guidelines' prohibition is not legally binding and should not be given
weight in the determination of whether an accommodation constitutes an undue
hardship.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.326 requires
consideration of mitigating measures in the determination of whether an individual
meets the ADA's definition of an individual with a disability.3' An individual will
be considered a person with a disability only if that individual is presently
substantially limited in a major life activity despite mitigating measures.32 This
decision significantly narrows the class of individuals protected under the ADA.329
As a consequence, future plaintiffs will more often attempt to qualify as an
individual with a disability under the third "regarded as" prong of the definition of
disability.
330
Moreover, in dicta, the Court called into question the validity not only of the
EEOC's regulations regarding the definition of "disability," 331 but also the EEOC's
"Interpretive Guidance" which provides guidelines for the interpretation of the
various employment sections of the regulations.332 As a result, the Sutton decision
will lead to an increase in petitions by litigants asking courts not to defer to the
EEOC regulations regarding the definition of disability nor to the EEOC's
"Interpretative Guidance."
333
324. Id. § 1630.2(o).
325. Id. § 1630.2(p).
326. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
327. Id. at 482.
328. Id.
329. Supra Part VIA.
330. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C) (West 1995).
331. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480.
332. Id. at 480.
333. Supra Part VI.B-C.
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